From key predistribution to key redistribution  by Cichoń, Jacek et al.
Theoretical Computer Science 453 (2012) 75–87
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Theoretical Computer Science
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/tcs
From key predistribution to key redistribution✩,✩✩
Jacek Cichoń, Zbigniew Gołębiewski, Mirosław Kutyłowski ∗
Faculty of the Fundamental Problems of Technology, Wrocław University of Technology, Wybrzeże Wyspiańskiego 27, 50-370 Wrocław, Poland
a r t i c l e i n f o
Keywords:
Symmetric cryptography
Key predistribution
Wireless ad hoc network
Eavesdropping
Authentication
Impersonation
Attack detection
Dynamic key management
Combinatorial class
Generating function
Projective plane
a b s t r a c t
One of crucial disadvantages of key predistribution schemes for ad hoc networks is that if
devices A and B use a shared key K to determine their session keys, then any adversarial
device that holds K can impersonate A against B (or vice versa). Also, the adversary holding
such a device can eavesdrop on communication between A and B for the lifetime of the
system.
We develop a dynamic scheme where the devices are preloaded with permanent keys
according to a predistribution scheme, but these keys are not used directly for setting up
session keys. For this purpose devices use a pool of temporal keys, which periodically are
selected at random by a system provider. The temporal keys are broadcast by the system
provider in an encrypted form (e.g. using the GSM network or local broadcasting services).
For the transmission, the temporal keys are encryptedwith permanent keys, each temporal
key occurringm times encryptedwithm different permanent keys. (Parameterm is a small
constant.)
Encrypting the same temporal key with different permanent keys has the effect that
with a high probability two devices share many more temporal keys than the permanent
keys from the main pool of keys. Also, the shared temporal keys come not only from
ciphertexts encrypted with shared permanent keys but predominantly from ciphertexts
encrypted with the permanent keys that are not shared by the devices. After each re-
distribution different pairs of permanent keys provide such shared temporal keys. This
feature is the key property of our design. It makes it possible not only to protect
communication against an adversary that has collected a large fraction of keys from the
main pool of keys, but also enables using key predistribution for authentication in the
presence of such an adversary.
Finally, we present a scheme for renewing the permanent keys in a way that an
adversary loses the knowledge of permanent keys except for the keys that it learns via
the legitimate devices that he holds. The scheme is based on projective plane techniques.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
One of key security challenges for ad hoc wireless networks of tiny artefacts is to protect node to node communication
over wireless channels. We are faced with problems concerning confidentiality, message integrity as well as authentication
of the nodes. While these problems have more or less satisfactory solutions for standard networks composed of more
powerful devices, there are many reasons for which these techniques are inadequate or infeasible in case networks of tiny
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artifacts. Unfortunately, lack of really good solutions in this area is a source of many serious risks and severely reduces
market chances of these networks.
So far usage of asymmetric cryptographic techniques for tiny devices is regarded as limited, even if there is a significant
progress in adjusting asymmetric techniques to limitations of tiny devices. On the other hand, symmetric techniques
are generally easier to implement on resource limited devices. Nevertheless, there are many efforts to further simplify
symmetric techniques in order to adjust them to the requirements of ultra lightweight devices.
One of fundamental techniques for networks of tiny artefacts is randomkey predistribution [9]. According to thismethod,
a system provider generates a large pool of keysK . Before a device gets deployed in the network, it gets a random subset
of keys fromK of cardinality k. The parameter k is carefully chosen as a function of the size ofK , say n. The construction is
based on the following observation: for a certain function f () such that limn→∞ f (α, n) = ln(α), if
k ≥ nf (α, n),
then two randomly chosen subsets ofK of cardinality k have a common keywith a probability at least 1− 1
α
. In this scenario,
if two devices have to establish a communication link protected by symmetric encryption, they derive a session key from
the key or keys that they share, i.e. from the keys that are stored by both devices.
Key predistribution approach has some notable advantages. First, there are no significant scalability problems. For a
reasonable size of the key pool there is practically unlimited number of different k-element subsets of the pool of keys.
(Indeed, even for n = 210 and k = 25, the number of k-element subsets is about 2200.) Second, choosing the keys at random
for a given device is very easy and requires no bookkeeping of already used subsets.
1.1. Extensions
Random key predistribution has also some disadvantages. It is impossible to guarantee that a pair of devices really shares
a key from the main poolK — due to random character of key assignment even if the expected number of shared keys is
one or more, it may happen that in fact no key is shared by two given devices. Irregularities in the number of keys shared
by two devices can be avoided by a careful choice of the subsets of keys to be stored in the devices. Examples of such an
approach are combinatorial designs from [4].
One can also increase the number of keys per device [5]. Consequently, a pair of devices sharesmultiple keys with a fairly
large probability. So fluctuations of the number of shared keys typically do not lead to lack of shared keys— a smaller number
of keys shared by two devices has only impact on strength of the session key established by these devices. Unfortunately, in
order to get m shared keys the size of the random subsets has to be at least of the order of n(m−1)/m, where n is the size of
the key pool.
Another approach is to use indirect links: if devices A and B have no shared key, but there is a different device C in
their range so that A shares a key with C and B shares a key with C , then A and B can communicate securely via C in order to
establish a session key [1,5]. Onemay also use longer paths from A to B— in this case the probability of failure of establishing
a session key between A and B can be significantly reduced and/or the number of keys k per device can be reduced. The last
option is particularly attractive in case of severe memory limitations of tiny devices.
1.2. Threat model
1.2.1. Adversary
We consider an adversary which is a user or a group of colluding users. We assume that the service provider delivering
the keys to the devices is honest and cannot be corrupted by the adversary to get any information apart from regular protocol
execution.
We assume that the communication protocol is secure so that the adversary cannot derive any key by applying
cryptanalytic tools to transcripts of eavesdropped communication sessions between honest devices.
On the other hand, the adversary may collect the keys fromK both from the devices obtained legally from the service
provider (as a user or users) as well as from some number of devices of other users that they grab. Retrieving the keys from
the devices has to be considered as feasible as key predistribution is intended to be used on cheap devices, and tamper
resistant ones are relatively expensive.
However, we assume that the number of devices that may be used by the adversary to retrieve the keys from K is
limited, and this bound is a parameter describing strength of the adversary. The goal of the system is to be resistant against
an adversary that can collect a large number of keys fromK .
1.2.2. Attacks
We assume that the devices need to deal with the following attack scenarios:
eavesdropping: if an adversary is holding all keys used by devices A and B to determine their session key, then it can compute
the session key just as A and B. Therefore, it can eavesdrop the whole communication between A and B.
This attack is quite realistic, since due to the key predistribution mechanism, if A and B share a single key K , then
the same key K is kept in average by a fraction of kn other devices. Consequently, an adversary having any of these
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devices can eavesdrop the communication link between A and Bwhenever it is in the range of A and B. The situation
is even worse, if the adversary has got keys from many devices.
impersonation: in case of communication between devices A and B there is an implicit authentication of the device B against
A (and vice versa) based on knowledge of a shared session key K . If the adversary holds all keys used to determine
K , it can compute the session key K . Consequently, the adversary can impersonate B against A (and vice versa). In
particular, it can play a man-in-the-middle attack, or hijack a communication link between A and B and inject its
own messages.
1.3. Countermeasures
There are some efforts to deter such attacks. One of them is to use q-composite schemes [5]: in order to establish a link
at least q shared keys are necessary. Since the adversary has to hold all shared keys used by communicating parties, this
seems to improve significantly resilience to the attack. However, in order to guarantee q shared keys, each device must hold
amuch larger fraction of keys from the key pool. This in turnmakes collecting the keys by the adversarymuch faster. It turns
out that using q-composite schemes improves the situation for adversaries collecting keys from relatively few devices and
has the opposite effect if the adversary retrieves keys from relatively many devices.
Ideally, each pair of devices should get a unique shared key. However, this is hardly possible in practice, since in a system
consisting of N devices each of them would have to hold N − 1 keys. Moreover, the set of devices would have to be fixed in
advance. This can be improved by Blom [2]: by an algebraic construction, a separate key can be computed for every pair of
devices and these keys remain inaccessible for the adversary as long as he holds key material from less than λ devices. (λ is
a design parameter having impact on efficiency of the solution.) There are some other designs of this kind (see for instance
[12]) reducing the number of keys per device. Still, there is a problem of adversaries that collect keys from devices. In case
of [12] it suffices to collect only 2 logN devices to break completely the system consisting of N devices.
Let us remark that the situation is much easier, if the devices are not mobile and their approximate location is known
in advance. Then one can distribute a given key only in a certain vicinity. In this case leaking a key to the adversary has an
impact limited to a certain area (see e.g. [13]).
Some progress in resilience against the adversary collecting the keys has been achieved in [7]. With a few levels of the
same key the chances of the adversary are decreased by a constant factor. However, the technique has its limitations — the
attack’s cost can be increased by at most 50%.
1.4. Goals
Our main concern in this paper is that random key predistribution enables an adversary to collect keys from the main
key pool by attacking single devices. Afterwards, such an adversary can create new fake devices (with the original keys), can
create clones of devices that are already in the system, and can eavesdrop communication protected with the keys from the
main key pool.
We address this problem and find a solution that substantially changes the situation of an adversary. However, as in
the pure scenario of random key predistribution the situation seems to be hopeless, we consider a practical scenario with
additional features. Namely, wemay assume that there is some broadcasting infrastructure run by the system provider that
may be used to refresh data held by devices. Such an infrastructure may be based on GSM or local wireless networks.
At the same time we assume that there is no upload channel from the devices. One of the practical reasons is that such a
channel would create problems with data protection: the provider would know the location of the devices and would have
to protect this information. In this way we would lose one of the main advantages of random key predistribution — the
inability to monitor activity of devices by the system provider.
1.5. Our contribution
We propose key predistribution schemes secure against an adversary. Our construction is based on two pools of keys:
1. a pool of temporal keys used for computing session keys which in turn secure communication between devices,
2. a pool of permanent keys used for updating the temporal keys.
The temporal keys are broadcast by the system provider, while the permanent keys are installed in the devices prior to their
deployment.
The system has the following properties:
• If devices A and C communicate, but C impersonates itself as B, then after broadcasting new temporal keys with a fairly
high probability device C will be unable to continue impersonating B. Thereby A will discover the fraud. This remains
true even if C collects some number of keys (both temporal and permanent ones) from other devices.
• Even if an adversary collects a (not too large) fraction of keys (both temporal and permanent ones), it cannot decrypt the
whole traffic between a pair of devices. The number of such periods is a random variable correlated with the number of
temporal keys collected by the adversary.
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In Section 4 we discuss a key revocation scheme related to the main construction. The revocation scheme works under
assumption that the system provider knows which devices are corrupted and tries to revoke the keys used by these devices.
This is the second mechanism proposed in this paper to cope with an active adversary. The revocation scheme proposed
here outperforms our former construction from [6] and is based on a different technique.
2. Dynamic key redistribution
2.1. Components of the system
Our system consists of wireless devices controlled by users and some infrastructure run by the system provider:
devices: they are tiny devices, such as sensors and/or weak mobile units, which communicate directly via wireless
encrypted links.
Each device is capable of holding a limited number of keys. For example, a standard micro-controller (e.g.
ATMega128L, found in Mica2 sensors) has 128 KB of program memory and 4 KB of configuration memory, which
must store the operating system, the code and additional data. This sets a serious limitation on the number of 128
B-long keys to be stored, unless external hardware (i.e.memorymodules) is used,which increases power demands,
complexity of the system and consequently — its price.
We assume that each device can perform symmetric encryption and decryption, can compute a hash function
and run a pseudo-random number generator.
Each device has to be aware of the current time so that it knows when to listen to the broadcast transmissions.
So each device is equipped with an internal clock. It may be assisted by the broadcasting system, as well (e.g. in
order to correct clock’s drift).
broadcasting system: the system provider runs a broadcasting wireless system that covers the area of operation of the
devices—we assume that each device in a network is in the range of the broadcasting system, i.e. it can receive the
messages sent by the broadcasting system. Communication is unidirectional; we assume that the devices cannot
reply to the broadcasting system. Moreover, we assume that the system is unaware of locations of the devices.
2.2. Identifiers
As alreadymentioned, our schememaintains a pool of permanent keys and a pool of temporal keys. Each device receives
a limited number of keys from each of these pools. Which keys of a pool should be available for a given device is determined
by the unique identifier of the device. For this purpose we can apply the following method: if the key pool concerned is
K = {K1, . . . , Kn}, then for a node vs we assign a set of keysKs = {Ks1 , . . . , Ksk} ⊂ K , where
(s1, . . . , st , . . .) := R(s, t),
R is a pseudo-random number generator yielding numbers in the range [1, n], and t is a public parameter. Note that
derivation mechanism must guarantee that anybody knowing the identifier of a device v and the public parameter t can
derive the indexes of the keys assigned to node v.
Just as in the case of the standard key predistribution scheme, we assume that if devices vc, vd meet and have to find
shared keys in order to establish a secure link between them, they first exchange their ID’s c and d. Then each of them
computes the ID’s of the keys shared with the other device, say Ku1 , . . . , Kub with u1 < u2 < · · · < ub. Then the session
key is computed from H(Ku1 , . . . , Kub , c, d, t), where t is some current parameter (like time) and H is a cryptographic hash
function.
2.3. Scheme description
The main feature of the scheme is that the system provider periodically refreshes the temporal keys used to compute
session keys. Since the only way of contact with the devices is via the broadcasting infrastructure, the system provider has
to generate and broadcast the new temporal keys. Of course, the new keys must be accessible to the entitled devices only.
Since the only secret material stored in the devices are the old pool keys, the broadcaster uses them to encrypt the new keys.
Assume thatK = {K1, . . . , Kn} is the current pool of keys used by the devices and the system provider decides to provide
a new pool of keys K = {K1, . . . ,Kn}.
A naïve way to do it is to transmit the following sequence of ciphertexts: EK1(K1), EK2(K2), . . . , EKn(Kn). However, the
only advantage of such an approach is bounding the number of ciphertexts exchanged between devices and related to the
same shared key(s). Thereby it reduces the volume of data available for cryptanalysis by an eavesdropper. On the other hand,
it does not help against impersonation and other attacks performed by an adversary holding some of the keys from the pool.
Indeed, if an adversary already holds Ki and uses it for attacks, then it will useKi in the same way.
The main idea of our scheme is that after the key update the indexes of the keys shared by two devices change. So our
goal is to achieve the following property:
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Property 1. The scheme to be proposed should have the property that if at some moment devices A and B establish a session key
using temporal keys Ku1 , . . . , Kub that they share, then after performing an update of temporal keys they share keys with different
indexes, sayKu′1 , . . . ,Ku′b′ where {u1, . . . , ub} ≠ {u′1, . . . , u′b′}with high probability. Moreover, knowledge of shared keys before
the update does not suffice to learn the shared keys after the update.
LetK denote the pool of permanent keys, and let K denote the pool of temporal keys. The update mechanism for the
pool K is described by Algorithm 2 (see the pseudocode attached).
Algorithm 1 Updating temporal keys by the system provider
Require: K is the pool of permanent keys and card(K) = n
Require: the size of the pool of temporal keys equal to n/m
1: generate a bijectionπ : {1, . . . , nm }×{1, . . . ,m} → {1, . . . , n} in a pseudo-randomway from a seed η chosen at random
2: generate at random a new pool K = {K1, . . . ,Kn/m} of nm temporary keys,
3: for i = 1 to nm do
4: for j = 1 tom do
5: compute eπ(i,j) = EKπ(i,j)
Ki
6: end for
7: end for
8: broadcast η
9: for t = 1 to n do
10: broadcast et
11: end for
As we see, the pool K contains exactly n/m keys chosen at random. Parameter m will be carefully chosen, generally
m ≥ 2 andmwill be a small integer. During the key update each keyKi is broadcast encrypted separately by exactlym keys
from poolK . Namely,Ki is transmitted within the ciphertexts
EKπ(i,1)(Ki), . . . , EKπ(i,m)(Ki) ,
where π is a bijection between {1, . . . , n/m}× {1, . . . ,m} and {1, . . . , n} chosen in a pseudo-randomway. The ciphertexts
are transmitted according to the order of the keys used for encryption, that is in the following sequence:
EK1(. . .), EK2(. . .), . . . , EKn(. . .) .
On the other side of the system there are devices receiving these ciphertexts and executing Algorithm 2 (see the
pseudocode attached). Each device vi decrypts only those ciphertexts, which are obtained using the permanent keys which
are known to vi. (Note that due to themethod of indexing the keys, a node vi knowswhich ciphertexts to decrypt andwhich
keys to use.)
Algorithm 2 Updating temporal keys by a device v
Require: permanent keys Ks1 , . . . , Ksk stored by v
Require: update information η, e1, . . . , en
1: compute π from η
2: for t = 1 to n do
3: if Kt is known to v, i.e. Kt = Ksu for some u < k then
4: decrypt et with Kt
5: store the result asKi where π−1(t) = (i, j)
6: end if
7: end for
The following observation is crucial for the performance of our scheme:
Proposition 2. There are two reasons for which devices A and B may share a keyKi:
Case 1: A and B share a key Kj ∈ K , and this key has been chosen to encryptKi by Algorithm 1,
Case 2: device A holds Kj, device B holds Kj′ , and π(i, u) = j, π(i, v) = j′, for u ≠ v.
The keys fromK that are shared due to Case 2 are called accidental shared keys.
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2.4. Broadcast volume
It is worth to see that refreshing the temporal keys does not require transmission volume that would be unacceptable
from a practical point of view. Indeed, for example values n = 216 and key length of 128 bits, the volume of the ciphertexts
sent is 8 Mbit. This compares well with transmission capacity of 3G systems (3.6 Mbit/s for HSPDA category 6) and even
transmission capacity of EDGE (236.8 kbit/s). Each device has to receive only a small fraction of transmission. For instance,
if each device holds
√
n permanent keys, then the transmission volume is
√
n · 128 = 215 bits, that is, 4 KB. If we go for a
larger number of keys such as n = 220 (a pool with over one million keys), and store 210 keys in a device, then each device
has to receive 16 KB. Still, the total transmission volume is 227 bits = 27 Mbits. For transmission speed 2 Mbits/s, it takes 26
s, roughly one minute to send the keys.
3. Properties of dynamic key redistribution
The first question we state is about the number of keys from pool K shared by two devices after transmitting the new
values of the keys in this pool. Our goal is to show that there are quitemany such keys (more than in the case of keys frompool
K). Later we shall see that this enables quite reliable authentication of devices and protection of message confidentiality
provided that the keys of K are renewed periodically.
Theorem 3. Let us assume that the key pool K contains n/m keys, each encrypted with m different keys from key pool K
(card(K) = n) during the key update procedure. Assume that each device holds exactly k keys from the poolK . Then for devices
A and B chosen at random:
1. the expected number of keys fromK shared by devices A and B equals k
2
n ,
2. the expected number of keys from K shared by A and B equals
n
m

1−
n−m
k
n
k
 2 . (1)
Remark 4. By Theorem 3 we can easily compute the expected number of accidental keys shared by two devices as the
difference between the above values. While the first expression is simple, the expression (1) standing for the number of
shared keys from K is hard to interpret. Later we provide some estimations and rules of thumb that follow from them.
However, let us underline that the exact value from Theorem 3 can be used for numerical calculations.
Proof. (1) Without loss of generality assume that A holds the keys K1, . . . , Kk. Let Xi be a random variable equal to 1, if B
holds Ki and equal to 0 otherwise. Obviously, Pr(Xi = 1) = kn . The expected number of keys shared by A and B is equal
to
E[X1 + · · · + Xk] =
k
i=1
E[Xi] =
k
i=1
k
n
= k
2
n
.
(2) The problem of computing exactly the expected number of shared keys from K by two devices is much more
complicated, since there are subtle complications due to the fact that the same key is sent in m different ciphertexts.
In particular, it is not true that a device always gets k temporal keys. First, we translate our question to the following
combinatorial problem:
Let Ω = {1, . . . , nm } × {1, . . . ,m} and π : Ω → {1, . . . , nm } be the projection function defined by the equality
π(i, j) = i.
Find the expected number of elements in the intersectionπ(A)∩π(B)where A, B are subsets ofΩ of cardinality
k chosen independently at random.
In the following we analyze this problem using tools of analytic combinatorics (a reader not familiar with these
techniques may find all necessary information in [10]).
For a while let us fix a point P ∈ Ω . We denote the occurrence of P in set A by the formal variable x, and we denote
the occurrence of P in set B by the formal variable y. Then the generating function describing all possible cases is given by
1 + x + y + xy (the factor 1 correspond to the event P /∈ A ∪ B, the factor x corresponds to the event P ∈ A \ B, the factor
y corresponds to the event P ∈ B \ A and the factor xy corresponds to the event P ∈ A ∩ B). Hence all the possible cases of
distribution elements of A, B in one ‘‘line’’ of the form {i} × {1, . . . ,m} is described by the function
a(x, y) = (1+ x+ y+ xy)m = (1+ x)m(1+ y)m.
If i /∈ π(A) ∩ π(B), then i /∈ π(A) or i /∈ π(B). Hence the generating function describing this situation is given by
b(x, y) = (1+ x)m + (1+ y)m − 1.
We use an additional variable z for marking the fact i ∈ π(A) ∩ π(B). Then the function
R(x, y, z) = ((a(x, y)− b(x, y))z + b(x, y)) nm (2)
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Fig. 1. The expected number of keys from K shared by A and B for n = 216 , 26 ≤ k ≤ 29 and m = 1 (i.e. standard key-predistribution case, the black
plot, the lowest curve), m = 2 (the blue plot, the second lowest curve), m = 4 (the dark pink plot, the third lowest curve), m = 8 (the dark red plot, the
second highest curve),m = 16 (the green plot, the highest curve). The dashed plots present approximations given by Corollary 5. (For interpretation of the
references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
describes all possible configurations of cardinalities of intersection π(A) ∩ π(B). Moreover, by standard facts of analytic
combinatorics we get that
E[card(A ∩ B)] = [x
k][yk] ddz R(x, y, z)|z=1
[xk][yk]R(x, y, 1) , (3)
where [xk]f (x) is the coefficient extraction function, i.e. [xk](n anxn) = ak. Standard calculus applied to formulas (2) and
(3) shows that
E[card(A ∩ B)] = n
m

1−
n−m
k
n
k
 2 . 
Fig. 1 plots the expected values from Theorem 3 for some practical values of k and m. Below we give also some useful
approximations.
Corollary 5. Suppose that m is fixed and k = Θ(√n). Letχ denote the number of temporal keys shared by two devices. Then
E[χ ] = m
n
k2 + O

1√
n

.
Proof. Notice thatn−m
k
n
k
 = k−1
a=0

1− m
n− a

.
Let us recall that ln 11−x =

j≥1 xj/j for |x| < 1. Hence
− ln
n−m
k
n
k
 =
j≥1
k−1
a=0
1
j

m
n− a
j
=
k−1
a=0
m
n− a +

j≥2
k−1
a=0
1
j

m
n− a
j
.
Let Hn = nk=1 1k denote the nth Harmonic number. Let us recall that Hn = ln n + γ + O  1n , where γ ≈ 0.57721 is the
Euler–Mascheroni constant. Sincem is fixed and k = Θ(√n), we have
k−1
a=0
m
n− a = m (Hn − Hn−k) = ln

n
n− k
m
+ O

1
n

.
Observe that
k−1
a=0

j≥2
1
j

m
n− a
j
≤
k−1
a=0

j≥2

m
n− a
j
=
k−1
a=0
 m
n−a
2
1− mn−a
.
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Sincem is fixed, k = Θ(√n) and mn−a ≤ mn−k for 0 ≤ a ≤ k− 1, we have
0 ≤
k−1
a=0

j≥2
1
j

m
n− a
j
≤ km
2
(n− k)(n− k−m) = O

1
n
3
2

.
Thereforen−m
k
n
k
 = 1− k
n
m
+ O

1
n

.
Finally, we get
E[χ ] = n
m

1−

1− k
n
m
+ O

1
n
2
= n
m

km
n
+ O

k
n
2
+ O

1
n
2
= n
m

km
n
+ O

1
n
2
= n
m

km
n
2
+ O

km
n2

+ O

1
n2

= n
m

km
n
2
+ O

1
n
3
2

= k
2m
n
+ O

1√
n

. 
As we have seen, if we apply dynamic key redistribution with parameterm, then
the expected number of temporal keys shared by two devices is approximately m for standard values of k and n (instead of
just 1 shared key in case of random key predistribution).
This result itself is a nice rule of thumb for system designers.
Moreover, let us observe that taking a small value like m = 16 leads to quite many shared temporal keys for a pair of
devices. In the next theorem we look closer what are the consequences of this fact for an adversary impersonating device
B against device A using keys stored in device C (recall that for the standard random key predistribution this is a hopeless
situation — if the adversary can impersonate B once, then it can do it forever).
Theorem 6. Let m and n have the same meaning as in Theorem 3. Assume further that adversary C holds s temporal keys drawn
at random, and s ≤ nm . Assume that the number of keys from K shared by devices A and B is m. Then the probability that C holds
all temporal keys shared by A and B is at most s ·m
n
m
.
Proof. Suppose that after broadcasting the new values of keys from pool K the devices A and B share a set TA,B ⊂ K of
temporal keys (card(TA,B) = m) and the device C holds a set TC ⊂ K temporal keys with card(TC ) = s. We shall calculate
the probability that TA,B ⊆ TC under the assumption that TA,B is a random subset of keys. Of course, we may assume that
m ≤ s.
We have
Pr[TA,B ⊆ TC ] =
 n
m−m
s−m
 n
m
s
 = s!
(s−m)! ·
 n
m −m
! n
m
! =
m−1
i=0
s− i
n
m − i
.
Wemay assume that s < nm (otherwise the adversary has all the temporal keys). The function f (x) = s−xnm−x is decreasing on
the interval [0, nm ). We deduce from assumptionsm ≤ s and s ≤ nm thatm ≤ nm . Therefore
Pr[TA,B ⊆ Q ] =
m−1
i=0
s− i
n
m − i
≤

s
n
m
m
=
 sm
n
m
. 
Corollary 7. Let m, k and n have the same meaning as in Theorem 3. Let TA,B ⊂ K be a set of keys shared by the devices A and B.
Let C ⊂ K denote a set of the temporal keys held by an adversary. Then
1. If card(C) = √n, then Pr[TA,B ⊆ C] ≤ ( m√n )m.
2. If card(C) < n
m21/m
, then Pr[TA,B ⊆ C] < 12 .
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By Corollary 7, even if the adversary holds quite a big fraction of keys from K (say n2m out of nm temporal keys), then still
the adversary has chances less than 12 to hold all temporal keys necessary to determine the session key of the connection
between A and B at a given time. So if the adversary tries to impersonate B against A, this should be discovered after a few
key redistribution rounds.
The bound n
m21/m
from Corollary 7 means the following fraction of the temporary keys: ≈0.71 for m = 2, ≈0.79 for
m = 3, ≈0.84 for m = 4, ≈0.93 for m = 10. Of course, we should not interpret the results of Corollary 7 as an indication
thatm should be maximized. While it is true that the probability of impersonation decreases rapidly whenm grows, at the
same time it becomes easier for the adversary to collect a higher fraction of keys. The choice of the valuem to be applied in
a concrete case has to depend on adversarial model. Namely,m depends on
• the maximal number s of the temporal keys that an adversary can get, and
• the tolerated probability p of the event that the adversary holds all temporary keys used by two users to establish a
session key.
For these parameters we have to find the smallestm such that s ·m
n
m ≤ p.
4. Revocation mechanism in a schema based on projective planes
For a long run, the mechanisms described so far might be insufficient: the adversary may perform attacks that among
others are based on cryptanalysis of ciphertexts transmitting temporary keys. In some cases the adversarymay even perform
known-plaintext attack, as the encrypted key can be known by the adversary as a holder of some number of devices. At this
point recall that the same temporal key is transmitted in many ciphertexts!
One can make the known-plaintext attack somewhat harder by appropriately encoding the key. Namely, in order to
encrypt a key K one can use two components: a random key K ′ and a symmetric ciphertext EK ′(K). At the price of doubling
the plaintext size we disable such attacks as differential or linear cryptanalysis. However, so far we cannot do anything
against an adversary that has captured some number of devices.
In a standard setting device revocation is hardly possible for random key predistribution. Once an adversary gets some
keys, then it can use them forever. For the re-distribution scheme described in the previous subsections, this does not
concern the temporal keys (as they are abandoned anyway after some period of time), but it is a potential threat for
permanent keys.
A straightforward solution would be to revoke all keys from the compromised devices. However, this may lead to a
substantial reduction of the number of keys in the system. If each device holds at least
√
n keys, then after revoking t
√
n
random devices the expected number of unrevoked keys is about n/et . Even for moderate values of t this substantially
reduces the chance that two random devices share a non-revoked key.
4.1. Key update mechanism with revocation
We present a solution based on a technique proposed by Çamtepe and Yener in [3] using projective planes over finite
fields. Let us first recall briefly the idea of this construction.
Let us fix a prime number p > 2 and consider the projective plane Ω = PG(2, p) (see e.g. [11]). Let us recall basic
properties of this space:
1. card(Ω) = p2 + p+ 1,
2. there are precisely p2 + p+ 1 different lines in PG(2, p),
3. there are precisely p+ 1 points on each line,
4. each of two different lines intersect at exactly one point,
5. for any two different points there exists exactly one line which contains them.
In short, let µ = p2 + p+ 1. The keys of the pool are indexed by points ofΩ:
K = {Kx : x ∈ Ω}.
To each device Awe assign a line lA in the planeΩ chosen at random (however, wemake sure that no line is assigned twice).
The set of keys given to device A is
KA = {Kx : x ∈ lA}.
Since every two lines in the projective plane have a non-empty intersection, we haveKA ∩KB ≠ ∅ for any two devices A
and B. Therefore each two devices can establish a direct connection. Moreover, each line inΩ has precisely p+ 1 points, so
card(KA) = p+ 1 ≈ √µ.
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During the revocation procedure the system provider transmits all keys of a new pool K . He considers sequentially all
lines {l1, . . . , lM} (M < µ) used by unrevoked devices and for each unrevoked device A the system provider sends new
versions of keysKw (w ∈ lA) in the following ciphertexts:
E⊕(KA)(Kw)
where⊕(KA) denotes bitwise XOR operation over all keys fromKA.
Notice that there are preciselyµ different lines in the spaceΩ , therefore the total numberM of lines used by devices does
not exceed µ. Hence we see that the message complexity of the proposed revocation schema is of orderM · √µ = O(µ 32 ).
4.2. Resilience of key update against an adversary
Proposition 8. If a user A does not know Kw , then after key update A does not knowKw . In particular, the number of positions
w, where A knows the current key, does not increase via key update.
Proof. Encryption of the keys fromKw requires knowledge of all keys from Kw , no matter which line is concerned. So if A
does not know Kw , he cannot decrypt any ciphertext containing the keys fromKw . 
Suppose that an adversary holds k devices and Ck denotes the number of keys stored in these devices and controlled by
the adversary. It was shown in [8] that the expected value of the random variable Ck is equal to the expected cardinality of
a sum
k
i=1 Xi, where X1, . . . , Xk are independent subsets of the setΩ and |Xi| = p+ 1 for each i. Therefore
E[Ck] = (p2 + p+ 1)

1−

1− p+ 1
p2 + p+ 1
k
. (4)
This easily implies that E[Cp] ≈ p2(1− 1/e). However, even though the adversary knows most of the keys from the pool it
is still possible to decrease his control over the pool of keys:
Proposition 9. Suppose that an adversary holds keys corresponding to at most p + 1 different lines. If one of these lines, say l,
gets revoked, then during the key update the adversary loses all keys corresponding to those points on l that do not belong to the
remaining lines with the keys held by the adversary. Moreover, as there is at least one such point, revocation of line l is effective.
Proof. Notice that there are p + 1 points on the line l. In order to learn the updated key corresponding to x ∈ l, the
adversary must be in control of a line different from l coincident with x. Indeed, since l gets revoked, no block of ciphertexts
corresponding to l is transmitted. However, as the adversary holds the keys corresponding to p lines different from l, the
new key for at least one point on lwill become unknown by the adversary. 
If an adversary has access to keys from p ln p devices, then from equation (4) we get E[Cp ln p] ≈ p2 + 12 ln p. In this case,
even though the adversary knows almost the whole pool of keys there is still a chance to decrease its control over the pool
of keys:
Proposition 10. Suppose that the adversary holds the keys corresponding to up to p ln p lines and the system provider revokes
one of them. Let Rp denotes the probability that after a key update the total number of updated keys owned by adversary decreases.
Then lim infp→∞ Rp ≥ 12 .
Proof. Suppose that the system provider knows that a line l is compromised and therefore he does not use l in the update
procedure. The adversary will be able to update the keys corresponding to line l, if for each point x ∈ l it will have all
keys from at least one line that contains x. Let Lx denote the family of lines containing x which are different from l. Then
card(Lx) = p for x ∈ l and Lx ∩ Ly = ∅ for different x, y ∈ l. LetA = {Lx : x ∈ l}. Note that card(A) = p2 + p, sinceA is
the set of all lines except l. Let r denote the number of lines different from l controlled by the adversary. Then r < p ln p and
there are
p(p+1)
r

of subsets of A of cardinality r . Let Gx = {X ⊆ A : card(X) = r ∧ X ∩ Lx = ∅} and G = {Gx : x ∈ l}.
Then G is the class of all configurations in which the adversary cannot reconstruct all keys from l. Note that
Pr[Gx] =

p(p+ 1)− p
r

p(p+ 1)
r

.
More generally, if x1, . . . , xa are pairwise different points from l, then
Pr[Gx1 ∩ · · · ∩ Gxa ] =

p(p+ 1)− ap
r

p(p+ 1)
r

.
Using the inclusion–exclusion principle we get
Rp = Pr[G] = 1p(p+1)
r
 p+1
i=1
(−1)i+1

p+ 1
i

p(p+ 1)− ip
r

.
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We need to find only a lower estimate of Pr[G], so we use the second Bonferroni bound
Rp ≥ 1p(p+1)
r
 2
i=1
(−1)i+1

p+ 1
i

p(p+ 1)− ip
r

,
hence
Rp ≥
2
i=1
(−1)i

p+ 1
i
 r−1
j=0

1− ip
p2 + p− j

.
It is a routine check that the right side of the above inequality converges to the number 12 when p →∞ and r = p ln p. 
Numerical experiments suggest that Proposition 10 may be improved. More precisely, we have found that Rp > 0.6 for
all primes p < 1200.
5. Discussion
In the previous sections we have described two schemes that can be used to change the keys used for establishing secure
communication between nodes of the system. There are some differences between them:
communication volume: the scheme from Section 2 requires that a separate ciphertext is sent for each key from the pool of
permanent keys. So if the number of keys in the main pool is n, then communication volume is n · L, where L is the
key length (e.g. 10 bytes). For a pool of 220 keys this yields a volume of about 10 MB.
The key update scheme from Section 4 requires that each user gets a separate set of ciphertexts (a line from
PG(2, p))—one ciphertext per key held by the user. So if there are M ≤ p2 + p + 1 users in the system, each
holding p+ 1 keys the communication volume isM · (p+ 1) · L bytes. Therefore if the number of keys in the main
pool is n = p2 + p + 1 then as long as the number of users is below 2n√
4n−3−1 = O
√
n

, communication volume
is lower than before. However, for n = 220 this holds for up to 1024 users.
number of users, number of keys: for the revocation scheme from Section 4 themaximal number of users equals the number
of lines (or points) in the projective space. So, say for 1million devices and the size of projective space p2+p+1 ≈
220, each device has to store about 210 keys. On the other hand, for random predistribution scheme with a pool
of size 2500 = 502 and each device holding 100 keys, with probability greater than 0.98 two devices chosen at
random can establish a session key. At the same time, the number of subsets of 100 out of 2500 keys is practically
unlimited (≈9 · 10180). The solution from Section 4 for p+ 1 = 102 keys per device guarantees full connectivity,
but the number of users is limited to 10303. This can be somewhat improved, if many disjoint projective spaces
are concerned and a user gets the keys corresponding to a single line in each space.
resilience to collecting the keys: an adversary collecting the devices in a legitimate way and reverse-engineering them in
order to get the keys stored inside, will gradually be able to break any communication link or impersonate as any
user. Refreshing the keys in the way described in Section 4 does not directly improve the situation—it helps only
against collecting the keys gradually via cryptanalysis. However, it can be used together with revocation, if the ID’s
of malicious devices are known.
The scheme from Section 2 contributes to resilience against cryptanalysis by reducing the number of ciphertexts
(in case of permanent keys) and the usage time (in case of temporal keys).
combining both schemes: both schemes can be easily combined—the scheme from Section 4 may be used to renew the
permanent keys,while temporal keys can beused for establishing communication links. Note that due to properties
of the scheme based on projective spaces any two devices share at least one temporal key. So it can be guaranteed
that a secure connection can be established.
5.1. Comparison with the scheme from [6]
In paper [6] we have provided a different approach for key revocation than described in Section 4. The main motivation
for a new design is the following phenomenon observed for the previous scheme: the scheme from [6] does not guarantee
that the number of (permanent) keys per device remains unchanged. Conversely, it can increase or decrease, depending on
the outcome of a random process. This has been confirmed by simulations.
On Fig. 2 we present some results concerning 1000 devices, 500 keys in a key pool, and 23 keys installed initially
per device. Note that after the first run of the procedure the smallest and the largest number of keys in a device differ
substantially. For instance, for the smallest number of keys in a device equals 7 and the largest equals 41. After the second
key update those numbers become quite different e.g. one device holds no key, two devices hold 81 keys. After the third key
update 49 devices hold no keys and one device holds 242 keys.
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(a) After the first run of the revocation procedure.
(b) After 2 runs of the revocation procedure.
(c) After 3 runs of the revocation procedure.
Fig. 2. Experimental results on revocation procedure from [6] for 1000 devices and a pool of 500 keys. The histograms depict the number devices for each
number of keys.
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